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LOGIC OR PUBLIC POLICY: SHOULD “CONFIRMATORY 
STATEMENTS” BE ACTIONABLE UNDER RULE 10b-5? 
Sean Keegan* 
ABSTRACT 
The fraud-on-the-market theory, originating in the Ninth Circuit1 and 
solidified by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,2 was developed 
to be the solution to an overwhelming evidence problem. Securities class 
action suits under the famous Rule 10b-5 had previously required a 
showing of reliance put upon each individual class member. The 
proliferation of large corporations becoming publicly traded on efficient 
markets, coupled with the increase of fraudulent practices to meet Wall 
Street’s demands, created situations where thousands of plaintiffs had 
legitimate Rule 10b-5 claims. Of course, having common defendants, 
classes were formed and suits filed. This, however, left attorneys in a 
problematic place, since they were required to show reliance for each 
individual. 
Recognizing the inefficiency of placing this burden on the plaintiff, 
courts began to develop the fraud-on-the-market theory in order to combat 
the problem. The theory gave plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
in class action Rule 10b-5 suits if the plaintiff could show that the 
defendant had made a public material misrepresentation, and that the 
                                                                                                                           
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2013; B.A., History, State University 
of New York at Genesco. 
1 Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975). 
2 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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defendant’s shares were traded in an efficient market during a period in 
which the plaintiff traded those shares.3 
Although the fraud-on-the-market theory repressed the evidentiary 
problem posed by class actions, a new issue has arisen more recently. In 
situations where a class period only covers misstatements that did not cause 
a fluctuation in the stock price, the Fifth Circuit has found those 
misstatements to be non-actionable.4 Since any misstatement that does not 
actually affect the market price is merely confirmatory, the Fifth Circuit has 
held that plaintiffs cannot actually be said to rely on the misstatement.5 
Since reliance is an element of Rule 10b-5 claims, the suit fails. Ardently 
disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit argued that allowing 
corporations to “prop up” stock prices with fraudulent statements was a 
major violation of public policy.6 
This Note argues that in approving of the fraud-on-the-market theory 
in Basic, the Supreme Court should rely on considerations of public policy 
which, in securities fraud cases, strongly outweigh considerations of logic 
contained in the Fifth Circuit’s strict reading of the law. Because of the 
rarity of ruling on this situation, the Supreme Court would be wise to adopt 
the Eleventh Circuit’s view in order to prevent forum shopping and the 
spread of the Fifth Circuit’s view. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 10B-5 AND THE FRAUD-
ON-THE-MARKET THEORY 
The substantive rule against insider trader and other fraudulent 
securities activities is SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, pursuant to congressional authority granted by 
Section 10(b) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7 Section 10(b), 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 Id. at 247–48. 
4 See Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that confirmatory 
statements are not actionable in a fraud-on-the-market suit). 
5 Id. 
6 See FindWhat Investors Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
confirmatory information that wrongfully prolongs a period during which stock is traded at inflated 
prices is actionable whether or not the level of inflation increases). 
7 ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING 
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 805 (11th ed. 2010). 
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combined with Rule 10b-5, has been expanded to have a significant breadth 
and function concerning securities litigation. In fact, Rule 10b-5 is, “by a 
considerable margin, the most famous rule in securities law and probably in 
all of business law.”8 
The first substantive case in which Rule 10b-5 was developed was 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., in which the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania held that Rule 10b-5 could be the basis of a private 
suit seeking to rescind a securities transaction.9 Although Rule 10b-5 
became famous in insider trading cases, it came to be relied upon in all 
cases involving “claims of securities fraud, deception, or trading in 
securities on the basis of undisclosed information in both publicly held and 
closely held corporations.”10 The rule was very flexible, and eventually, 
price fixing, or artificial inflation of a stock price or depression of a stock 
price through manipulation, became heavily litigated under Rule 10b-5. 
Although courts began liberally construing both Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, limitations began to constrain the rule in 1975 when the 
Supreme Court adopted the Second Circuit rule from Birnbaum v. Newport 
Steel Corp.11 In Birnbaum, the Second Circuit established that private 
plaintiffs had to be actual buyers or sellers of securities to bring a Rule 10b-
5 action.12 Although a defendant could still be charged with a Rule 10b-5 
violation without buying or selling, the ruling began a series of actions 
making pleading more difficult for private plaintiffs. 
Much of the litigation in private actions centered on whether a Rule 
10b-5 action required scienter and whether aiding and abetting was 
actionable.13 Supreme Court decisions on insider trading suits, also created 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 Id. 
9 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
10 HAMILTON, supra note 7, at 807. 
11 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that a potential 
buyer failed to buy because of misleading statements could not use Rule 10b-5 because they weren’t 
actual purchasers). 
12 See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). 
13 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that Rule 10b-5 applies only to 
activities that involve scienter); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding secondary actors acted with reckless disregard, and thus scienter was properly 
pleaded under a 10b-5 case). 
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several doctrines in which to control suits brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5.14 
Through litigation, courts have manifested five elements needed to state a 
private securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. The plaintiff must allege, “in 
connection with a purchase or sale of securities, (1) a misstatement or an 
omission, (2) of material fact, (3) made with scienter, (4) on which plaintiff 
relied, (5) that proximately caused [the plaintiff’s] injury.”15 
At common law, plaintiffs had to prove reliance, the fourth element, 
by showing that they reasonably relied on a material misstatement that 
induced the transaction.16 Reliance in securities fraud became known as 
“transaction causation,” which is essentially the same as “but-for” 
causation.17 As this standard became incorporated into Rule 10b-5 claims, 
difficulties arose. One such difficulty was proving individual reliance in a 
class action suit with potentially thousands of plaintiffs. 
It became axiomatic that the court system needed to create a doctrine 
for class action Rule 10b-5 reliance. The Ninth Circuit is credited with 
spelling out a solution as it created the conceptual basis of fraud-on-the-
market theory.18 The Ninth Circuit, in Blackie v. Barrack, held that 
common law reliance does not govern “the necessary nexus between the 
plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”19 The theory 
would solve the difficulty that proving reliance for members of a class 
action materialized, and today, “most federal securities class actions . . . 
rely on the ‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory.”20 
What the fraud-on-the-market theory, based on the efficient market 
hypothesis, actually manifests is “a rebuttable presumption that 
(1) misrepresentations by an issuer affect the price of securities traded in 
the open market, and (2) investors rely on the market price of securities as 
an accurate measure of their intrinsic value.”21 In other words, if the 
defendant’s misrepresentation or scheme to defraud targeted the entire 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 
222 (1980). 
15 Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 661. 
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
17 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
18 Harold S. Bloomenthal, Fraud on the Market, 2 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 27:21 (2000). 
19 Blackie, 485 U.S. at 243. 
20 Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-Five Defenses Securities Litigators Need to 
Know, 62 BUS. LAW. 1281, 1323 (2007). 
21 Id. (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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market, and not just an individual plaintiff, than the plaintiff did not have to 
prove individual transaction causation.22 The theory is thereby narrowed to 
encompass only potential class action suits. All a plaintiff is required to do 
is to plead under a fraud-on-the-market theory, and the transaction 
causation would be presumed, albeit rebuttable by the defendant. In doing 
so, a plaintiff is relying on the integrity of an open and well-developed 
market.23 
The most significant case in fraud-on-the-market is the Supreme Court 
case of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, which gave the fraud-on-the-market theory 
traction. Concisely put, the Supreme Court described the theory as: 
based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the 
price of a company’s stock is determined by the available material information 
regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will therefore 
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements. . . . The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the 
plaintiffs’ purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of 
direct reliance on misrepresentations.24 
In Basic, the petitioner, Basic Incorporated, publically denied, on three 
separate occasions, that meetings of a possible merger had taken place.25 
Former Basic shareholders alleged a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
claiming that they sold their shares between the first public denial and 
suspension of trading in Basic stock just prior to the merger, and thus sold 
their shares at what was an artificially low price.26 A Supreme Court 
plurality recognized that in a class action such as Basic, the plaintiffs had an 
unrealistic evidentiary burden if they were required to prove each and every 
class member’s reliance.27 Thus, the Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market 
theory which applied a presumption of reliance rather than requiring each 
class member to show direct reliance on the defendant’s fraudulent 
statements.28 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 See, e.g., Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 298–99 (5th Cir. 1990). 
23 Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1994). 
24 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
25 Id. at 227. 
26 Id. at 228. 
27 Id. at 245. 
28 Id. at 250. 
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Although the petitioners in Basic worried that the fraud-on-the-market 
theory effectively eliminated the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5, the 
Court reiterated that in a modern market, securities changed hands millions 
of times a day as compared to the early fraud “face-to-face” transactions, 
and, accordingly, the understanding of Rule 10b-5’s reliance requirement 
“must encompass these differences.”29 The Court ultimately held that the 
presumption of reliance was supported by “common sense and probability,” 
ruling that “[a]n investor who trades stock at the price set by an impersonal 
market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price.”30 The Court 
continued, “[b]ecause most publically available information is reflected in 
market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material 
misrepresentations . . . may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 
action.”31 
Today, it is well-developed that if the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant made public material representations, that the defendant’s shares 
were traded in an efficient market, and that plaintiffs traded shares between 
the time the misrepresentations were made and the time that the truth was 
revealed, the plaintiff is then entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance. If the plaintiff does not have the burden, as they do with other 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions, they do not have to produce evidence 
sufficient to show that the defendant’s misstatements altered the market 
price of the subjective securities.32 Instead, “once the plaintiff has shown 
that materially misleading statements have been disseminated into a well-
developed securities market, the burden shifts to the defendant to ‘sever the 
link’ between the misstatements and market price.”33 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RULE 10B-5 CONCERNING FRAUD-ON-THE-
MARKET AND CONFIRMATORY STATEMENTS 
A circuit split has developed over the question of whether a 
confirmatory statement disseminated by a corporation in a fraud-on-the-
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Basic, 486 U.S. at 243–44. 
30 Id. at 246–47. 
31 Id. at 247. 
32 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D, Cause of Action for Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act and/or Rule 10b-5, § 13 (1997). 
33 Id. 
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market Rule 10b-5 claim is actionable. When the issue does arise, the courts 
must ask whether a Rule 10b-5 action is proper, since the misstatement 
does not affect the market, for the market had already digested the 
information. The Fifth Circuit has held that a Rule 10b-5 action is improper 
in the case of confirmatory statements, and the Eleventh Circuit has 
strongly disagreed. 
A. The Fifth Circuit’s View: Confirmatory Statements Are Not Actionable 
In 2001, the Fifth Circuit first set up the premise in Nathenson v. 
Zonagen Inc. that confirmatory statements may not be actionable under 
Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market claims.34 The court held that despite the 
loosening of the reliance requirement set out in Basic, “[i]f the market price 
was not actually affected by the statement, reliance on the market price 
[did] not of itself become reliance on the statement.”35 Simply put, investors 
were required to show that the allegedly false misrepresentation actually 
affected the stock price. Therefore, an increase in the stock price after the 
release of false positive information or a decrease in price following 
disclosure of true negative information was required. If a percent drop or 
rise was not significant, the investors still had to show that an earlier false, 
non-confirmatory statement actually affected the price. Although the court 
set up a “special circumstances” exception,36 the Fifth Circuit has been 
reluctant to apply it. 
Greenberg v. Crossroads Systems, Inc. further clarified the Nathenson 
holding. In Greenberg, purchasers of Crossroads Systems, Inc. 
(“Crossroads”) stock filed a putative class action against Crossroads and 
three officers for securities fraud under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.37 Crossroads designed, 
manufactured, and sold storage routers.38 On January 25, 2000, Crossroads 
announced that they were beginning to produce Third Generation routers, 
and continued to make additional statements concerning the routers for the 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001). 
35 Id. at 419. 
36 Id. The Eleventh Circuit cites this exception since it appears to conflict with the Fifth Circuit’s 
view in Nathenson. 
37 Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 659. 
38 Id. at 660. 
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next several months.39 On July 27, 2000, Crossroads disseminated a series 
of unfavorable news items, including the fact that they had stopped 
shipment on their products because of interoperability problems.40 As a 
result, the price of Crossroads stock fell by approximately one-half.41 
At issue in the case was the period from January 25, 2000 to 
August 24, 2000, in which the plaintiffs alleged that Crossroads had made 
several material public misrepresentations “overstating the interoperability 
and other capabilities of its router products that tended to inflate the price of 
the company’s stock.”42 As a result of these misrepresentations, the 
plaintiffs alleged securities fraud violations.43 
The plaintiffs argued that the rule of Nathenson allowed them “to 
benefit from the presumption of reliance if it can be shown that ‘special 
circumstances’ prevented the price from otherwise rising.”44 The Fifth 
Circuit did not agree, holding that the example in Nathenson was merely an 
example showing that stock prices are not affected by confirmatory 
information.45 The court went on to say “[i]t is the actual movement of 
stock price which must be shown by fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs, and a 
plaintiff cannot relieve himself of this obligation by referring to ‘special 
circumstances’ in an attempt to explain non-movement of the stock price.”46 
The plaintiffs also argued that the decline in stock price after the 
July 27, 2000 statement was evidence that Crossroads had inflated the price 
of stock with their earlier statements.47 The court noted that “the main 
concern when determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to the presumption 
of reliance is the casual connection between the allegedly false statement 
and its effect on a company’s stock price.”48 The court held that to establish 
the nexus that the plaintiffs had to show that the stock price was actually 
affected and this is ordinarily shown by an increase following the release of 
                                                                                                                           
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Greenberg, 364 F.3d at 660. 
43 Id. at 659. 
44 Id. at 663. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Greenberg, 364 F.3d 657 at 665. 
48 Id. 
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positive information.49 Plaintiffs could also make this showing following 
the release of the alleged truth of earlier misrepresentations.50 
The result of Greenberg was that some of the statements made were 
actionable, each time the court reiterated that the statements were “non-
confirmatory and therefore actionable.”51 However, both the district court 
and the Fifth Circuit held that the statement made on February 7, 2000 was 
confirmatory and thus not actionable.52 The February 7, 2000 statement had 
been previously released to the market by Crossroad’s on January 25, 2000 
and since “confirmatory information does not actually affect the stock 
price” it “cannot form the basis of the plaintiffs fraud-on-the-market 
claim.”53 The court explained why the misrepresentation had to be non-
confirmatory to be actionable: 
Finally, it is necessary that the earlier positive misrepresentation not be 
confirmatory. As we noted in our example in Nathenson, confirmatory 
information has already been digested by the market and will not cause a change 
in stock price. Because the presumption of reliance is based upon actual 
movement of the stock price, confirmatory information cannot be the basis for a 
fraud-on-the-market claim.54 
Greenberg meant that the plaintiff had to demonstrate, following an 
allegedly true disclosure that caused a sharp decrease in stock price, that a 
stock’s price was actually affected. To do so the plaintiff had to show that 
“the negative truthful information causing the decrease in price [was] 
related to an allegedly false, non-confirmatory positive statement made 
earlier” and that it was “more probable than not that it was this negative 
statement and not other unrelated negative statements, that caused a 
significant amount of the decline.”55 The Fifth Circuit had raised, or at least 
clarified, its proof requirements for application of the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance that no other Circuit had nor has. 
Defendants within the Fifth Circuit subsequently began to argue that 
plaintiffs failed to show that any statement by them was anything but 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 666. 
52 Id. at 670. 
53 Id. 
54 Greenberg, 364 F. 3d 657 at 666–67. 
55 Id. at 666. 
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confirmatory under Greenberg.56 It was an easy defense to label a 
fraudulent statement as “confirmatory.” The district courts adopted with 
this line of thinking; “[f]irst, as a matter of law, the alleged 
misrepresentations in the offering memoranda . . . [and] . . . filings are 
‘confirmatory’ and cannot be the basis for a fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance.”57 One district court went as far as saying it was 
irrelevant if the defendants “knew of any fraudulent statements or were 
reckless in approving the offering memoranda” continuing that intent did 
not cure that problem of “confirmatory statements” which under Greenberg 
“cannot trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.”58 
In Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Haliburton Co., 
the Fifth Circuit again held that the plaintiff was required to show that the 
misstatement actually moved the market.59 The plaintiff had to establish 
“loss causation in order to trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption.”60 
The court ruled that it wasn’t enough merely to show that the market price 
declined after a statement reporting negative news and that the “main 
concern when addressing the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance 
is whether allegedly false statements actually inflated the company’s stock 
price.”61 The plaintiffs were required to show that a loss occurred from the 
decline in stock price because the truth made its way into the marketplace 
rather than for some other reason, such as a changed investor expectations, 
or other independent factors.62 The court noted that the earlier positive 
misrepresentation must not be confirmatory, because that information was 
already known by the market, and those statements would not affect the 
stock price.63 
In sum, the Archdiocese of Milwaukee court held that the correct 
standard for the plaintiff’s burden was to present evidence that a fraudulent 
non-confirmatory statement caused the stock price to rise by showing that 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 663 (2006). 
57 Id. at 774. 
58 Id. at 775. 
59 Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 335 (5th 
Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded sub nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 
(U.S. 2011). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 337. 
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“an alleged corrective disclosure causing the decrease in price is related to 
the false, non-confirmatory positive statement made earlier, and that it is 
more probable than not that it was this related corrective disclosure, and not 
any other unrelated negative statement, that caused the stock price 
decline.”64 Ultimately the court held that the alleged misrepresentations and 
corrective disclosures failed to meet the requirement for proving loss 
causation at the class certification stage.65 The case would be overturned by 
the Supreme Court66 on a different issue, but the Supreme Court did not 
comment on anything past the formation of a class, rather remanding it to 
decide the remaining issues, including confirmatory statements. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee does show that the Fifth Circuit, despite slight 
inconsistencies, still adheres to Greenberg as recently as 2010. 
A. The Eleventh Circuit Weighs In: Confirmatory Statements Are 
Actionable 
The Eleventh Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit 
concerning whether confirmatory statements could be actionable under 
Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market suit: 
While we agree with the Fifth Circuit that confirmatory information will not 
likely move the market price at the time of its release-because the market already 
digested the information when it was first released-we do not agree that such 
confirmatory information can never be actionable. If a company knowingly 
makes materially false representations with the purpose and effect of preventing 
the stock price from falling to the level that the truth would yield, the company 
is responsible for perpetuating inflation within the stock price.67 
In FindWhat Investor Group v. FindWhat.com, investors alleged, in a 
class action, securities fraud against an internet commerce company and 
three of its officers for making false and misleading statements and material 
omissions in order to inflate the company’s stock price.68 The defendant, 
MIVA, Inc. (“MIVA”), provided a pay-per-click advertising service in 
which the advertisers pay MIVA each time an internet user clicks on their 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 344. 
66 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
67 FindWhat Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011). 
68 Id. at 1290. 
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ad.69 The revenue was decided by the price that advertisers bid for a click 
on their ads, and the number of clicks generated on those ads.70 In other 
words, the more clicks the better revenue for MIVA. However, the more 
advertiser-paid clicks that fail to translate into income for the advertiser, the 
lower the price the advertisers bid for the ad.71 Unfortunately, and at issue 
in the case, was practice of click fraud, which “refers to the practice of 
clicking on an Internet advertisement for the sole purpose of forcing the 
advertiser to pay for the click.”72 Click fraud uses spyware, browser 
hijacking software, and other bots or non-human clickers and can be very 
costly to advertisers that pay-per-click. It was therefore important to 
prevent for companies like MIVA because it led to lower conversion rates, 
and thus lower bids.73 
Plaintiffs in FindWhat¸ alleged that MIVA’s top revenue distribution 
partners, who were responsible for one-third of MIVA’s revenue, began to 
use click-fraud.74 Although the clicks were high, MIVA began seeing lower 
bids from advertisers and lost some of its high quality distribution partners 
because they left due to decreasing revenues.75 This meant that an even 
larger portion was being generated from click fraud. Since click-fraud, 
although eventually deleterious, ensured short term gains, and MIVA 
appeared to be doing well and continued to meet or exceed analyst’s growth 
expectations every year.76 MIVA became “obsess[ed] with meeting Wall 
Street’s forecasts, these expectations were sometimes met by as little as 
penny.”77 
Eventually regulators began cracking down on click-fraud, and MIVA, 
trying to remain proactive, claimed in a company conference call that they 
had removed distribution partners with $70,000 in revenue per day because 
they wanted higher quality traffic.78 However, some evidence showed that 
no traffic was taken off line, and the click-fraud distributors were not 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 Id. at 1291. 
70 Id. 
71 FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1291. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1292. 
74 Id. 
75 FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1292. 
76 Id. at 1292–93. 
77 Id. at 1293. 
78 Id. 
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removed from the network, or that these were fraudulent statements. In a 
March 16, 2005 Form 10-K annual report filed with the SEC, MIVA again 
claimed that they were removing low-quality distributors.79 On the same 
Form 10-K, MIVA asserted that they did not rely on spyware for any 
purpose and they had implemented screening policies to detect click-
fraud.80 On May 5, 2005, MIVA issued a press release announcing 
disappointing first quarter results, and that day the company revealed the 
click-fraud was responsible for some of MIVA’s revenue, and that some 
distributors had not been adhering to MIVA standards. As a result, MIVA’s 
share price dropped significantly, over 21 percent in one day.81 
The district court, in granting MIVA’s summary judgment motion, 
concluded that the plaintiffs did not show the elements of loss causation and 
damages related to two of the statements at issue.82 The March 16, 2005 
SEC Form 10-K filing was merely a repetition of prior statements and did 
not “move the market up or down.”83 Since the price inflation of the stock, 
which was 26.44%, existed on February 24, 2004, and remained at that 
level after both the February 23, 2005 and March 16, 2005 statements, “the 
inflation in the stock price was caused by statements made prior to the class 
period in this case.”84 The district court held that the although the particular 
statements were otherwise actionable, since the inflation level did not 
change as a result of the alleged misrepresentations they could not have 
caused the plaintiff’s losses. 
The Eleventh Circuit vehemently disagreed with the MIVA court 
calling the ruling “legal error.”85 Ultimately holding that: 
The Defendants may be held liable for knowingly making materially false 
statements that continued to prop up the already inflated price of MIVA’s stock 
and thereby caused losses to investors, regardless of whether MIVA’s stock 
price was already inflated before the actionable statements were made.86 
                                                                                                                           
 
79 FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1293. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 In re MIVA, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-201-FtM-29DNF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106842, at *16 (M.D. 
Fla. Nov. 16, 2009). 
83 Id. at *14. 
84 Id. at *15. 
85 FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1307. 
86 Id. 
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The court’s analysis, explained below, largely attacked Greenberg on the 
premise that defendants, if not for the fraudulent statements, may not have 
suffered loss if the truth was revealed at the onset of the class period. 
Citing Greenberg, the Eleventh Circuit noted that confirmatory 
information will not change the stock price because the market had already 
“digested the information.”87 However, the court noted that the falsity keeps 
the stock fraudulently inflated and therefore taints the mix of public 
information, or in other words, it “props” the fraudulent stock price up. 
Again, the fraud-on-the-market case allows the reliance element of a Rule 
10b-5 claim to be rebuttably presumed, so long as the statement was 
material and the market was informationally efficient. The court, quite 
simply, continued that everyone who relies on the market price, relies on 
the misrepresentation that is fed into the market.88 
Since proof of a fraudulently inflated purchase price only satisfies 
reliance; loss causation requires going a step further to supply the logical 
link between the inflated share purchase price and any later economic 
loss.89 Since in this case, the inflation was caused by statements made prior 
to the class period, the court had to address the problem that Greenberg and 
the district court had proposed. Since the statements made by the 
defendants during the class period could not have caused the inflation, they 
therefore could not have caused the plaintiff’s losses. A conclusion that 
seemed logical to the Fifth Circuit, and the MIVA district court. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the Greenberg and MIVA reasoning 
“misapprehends the nature of market fraud.”90 The court argued that to say 
that statements that had no immediate effect on an already inflated stock 
price could not cause harm was “erroneous.”91 Continuing, the court ruled 
that the inflation level did not have to change for new investors to be 
harmed by a false statement, as the false statement prevented the stock price 
from falling and prolonged the period that it remained at the unduly high 
inflation price.92 Causing a stock price to remain inflated fraudulently 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 Id. at 1310. 
88 Id. at 1311–12. 
89 Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 342. 
90 FindWhat, 658 F.3d 1314. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 1314. 
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caused the defendant to be liable. Ignoring confirmatory statements would 
punish those whom had a class period outside of that initial fraudulent 
statement, as in FindWhat.93 The longer inflation remains with the stock, 
the more buyers who stand to lose when the inflation dissipates. The court 
could not comprehend a “reason to draw a lega[l] distinction between 
fraudulent statements that wrongfully prolong the presence of inflation in a 
stock price and fraudulent statements that initially introduce that 
inflation.”94 
III. SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT DECIDE WHETHER CONFIRMATORY 
STATEMENTS ARE ACTIONABLE UNDER RULE 10B-5 
Whether the Supreme Court should decide the actionable confirmatory 
information issue in a fraud-on-the-market class action suit depends on the 
expansion of Fifth Circuit view, including within the Fifth Circuit itself. 
Although the Fifth Circuit expressly held that confirmatory information 
cannot be actionable in Greenberg, certain opinions have questioned that 
rule. It seems unclear if they will stay consistent. Since no other circuit has 
held that confirmatory statements are not actionable, the circuit split may 
disappear. Inklings of opposition to a rule where confirmatory information 
is not actionable began with Nathenson and the “certain special 
circumstances” exception: 
We also realize that in certain special circumstances public statements falsely 
stating information which is important to the value of a company’s stock traded 
on an efficient market may affect the price of the stock even though the stock’s 
market price does not soon thereafter change. For example, if the market 
believes the company will earn $1.00 per share and this belief is reflected in the 
share price, then the share price may well not change when the company reports 
that it has indeed earned $1.00 a share even though the report is false in that the 
company has actually lost money (presumably when that loss is disclosed the 
share price will fall).95 
                                                                                                                           
 
93 Id. at 1315. Other statements were thrown out for FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) reasons, shortening 
the class period. 
94 Id. at 1316. 
95 Nathenson, 267 F.3d 419. 
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The Eleventh Circuit has pointed to this paragraph as hole in the 
Greenberg argument.96 Nathenson was frequently cited by Greenberg and it 
seemed the facts of Greenberg and the like would fit this “special 
circumstances” situation. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit did not apply this 
standard, instead drawing a bright-line rule that confirmatory statements are 
not actionable. 
Also questioning the bright-line rule was a concurring Circuit Judge of 
the Fifth Circuit in Regents of University of California v. Credit Suisse First 
Boston, Inc.97 In Regents, the defendant investment banks, claimed the 
district court erred by failing to apply Greenberg, and holding that the 
misrepresentations made were non-confirmatory and therefore non-
actionable.98 The Fifth Circuit majority disallowed the formation of a class 
because they failed to get the required presumption of reliance based on a 
lack of duty.99 The concurring Circuit Judge Dennis returned to the district 
court holding and held that indeed they wouldn’t use Greenberg to relieve 
the defendants of the burden.100 He rationalized this by citing to Basic’s 
“unmistakably clear” statement that the defendant had the burden of 
rebutting the presumption of reliance.101 This presumption arose out of 
consideration of “fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial 
economy.”102 The concurrence noted that the Fifth Circuit had correctly 
applied Basic previously in Fine v. American Solar when they recognized 
that the defendant could rebut Basic’s presumption of reliance only “by 
showing the nondisclosures did not affect the market price;” or that the 
plaintiffs “would have purchased the stock at the same price had they 
known the information that was not disclosed;” or “that the plaintiff 
actually knew the information that was not disclosed to the market.”103 
However, the concurrence felt that the Greenberg panel changed course 
unjustifiably and held that it was actually the plaintiff’s burden to show that 
                                                                                                                           
 
96 FindWhat, 658 F.3d 1314 n.33. 
97 482 F.3d 372, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2007) (Dennis, J., concurring). 
98 Id. at 401. 
99 Regents, 482 F.3d 372, 384 (5th Cir. 2007). 
100 Id. at 401 (Dennis, J., concurring). 
101 Id. 
102 Regents, 482 F.3d at 402 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 245). 
103 Id. 
2012-2013] LOGIC OR PUBLIC POLICY 179 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.54 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
the defendant’s misrepresentation actually moved the market price of the 
stock.104 
The concurring judge in Regents followed the same line as the 
Eleventh Circuit would subsequently; “Greenberg appears to have 
mistakenly relied on this court’s earlier decision in Nathenson.”105 
Continuing that Nathenson merely determined that the district court had not 
erred when it ruled that the “allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint 
affirmatively demonstrated that the misrepresentations in question did not 
affect the price of the issuer’s stock.”106 In other words, just because the 
plaintiffs in Nathenson affirmatively pleaded themselves out of the fraud-
on-the-market presumption lent “no support to the view that securities 
plaintiffs can invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption only if they first 
affirmatively demonstrate that the market moved in response to the alleged 
misrepresentation.”107 The concurrence ended this issue with; “[b]ecause 
the Greenberg panel’s decision to reallocate the burdens in fraud-on-the-
market cases conflicts not only with Basic, but also with earlier decisions of 
this court, such as Fine, I would follow those decisions and hold that the 
defendant retains the burden of rebutting Basic’s presumption of 
reliance.”108 
Nevertheless, currently it appears that the Fifth Circuit still adheres to 
the non-actionability of confirmatory statements in Rule 10b-5 class 
actions. The most recent ruling on the issue was 2010’s Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, in which the court made no mistake in assuring that 
confirmatory statements were non-actionable.109 Also, there is no telling if 
district courts, such as in MIVA, will arise and use similar doctrine, which 
does have roots in logic. 
On the opposite end, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to several 
jurisdictions that do not follow the Greenberg principles.110 However, they 
                                                                                                                           
 
104 Id. at 402. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 403. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Haliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 338 (5th 
Cir. 2010). 
110 See In re Cooper Sec. Litig., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (denying summary 
judgment to defendants on loss causation grounds on the basis that “it [was] disputed as to whether the 
[defendants’] statements caused artificial inflation to continue to be incorporated into the stock price, as 
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to fail to point to another circuit court that wholly agrees with them, instead 
citing district courts. Although one could argue that the circuit court did not 
correct the district courts, it is well settled that the Supreme Court’s or a 
circuit court’s decision to deny an appeal “does not in any sense constitute a 
ruling on the merits of the case in which the writ is sought.”111 This split is 
a real issue, and for the time being will remain one. 
Despite some inconsistencies in the Fifth Circuit, with the amount of 
litigation surrounding securities because of economic failures and 
unprecedented fraudulent behavior of securities investors, it seems 
important for the Supreme Court to rule on the issue. Because many of the 
defendants are large corporations that may be sued in different jurisdictions, 
forum shopping will no doubt occur. The Fifth Circuit will be avoided by 
classes whose class period doesn’t cover initial statements that caused 
inflation. At the same token, if plaintiffs are entrapped in the Fifth Circuit, 
law that the Supreme Court may deem unfair will be applied, just as 
defendants sued in the Eleventh Circuit may be subject to law that is 
deemed unfair. The gravity of the cases yearns for national consistency, as 
they usually are multi-million dollar affairs. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY OR LOGIC; WHICH MAKES MORE SENSE? 
Logically, the Greenberg view does have strong roots. Although the 
terms are often complicated, what plaintiffs need to prove to establish 
reliance in securities cases is but-for causation.112 Basic essentially held that 
if the market was efficient then the courts could presume but-for causation 
                                                                                                                           
 
opposed to revealing the truth, which allegedly would have caused the stock price to fall” (emphasis 
added)); In re Scientific Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1380 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2010) 
(“Plaintiffs argue persuasively that the class period inflation includes . . . the pre-class period inflation 
that would have been removed from the stock price had [the company] accurately provided information 
about [the relevant truth at the start of the class period].”); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., No. 
Civ.A. 00-1990 (SRC), 2005 WL 2007004, at *17 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2005) (stating, in the materiality 
context, that “it is conceivable that [an affirmative] misstatement could serve to maintain the stock price 
at an artificially inflated level without also causing the price to increase further”). 
111 Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259, 1259 (1997). 
112 Keith A. Rowley, Cause of Action for Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act and/or Rule 10b-5, 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 271, § 11 (originally published in 
1997). 
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or reliance on a misstatement.113 Basic made sure to note that this was a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance and “[any] showing that severs the link 
between the alleged misrepresentation and . . . the price received (or paid) 
by the plaintiff” could successfully rebut the presumption.114 This burden 
was “staggering” and makes rebuttal “virtually impossible in all but the 
most extraordinary case.”115 “In order to demonstrate absence of impact, a 
defendant, essentially, must prove a negative.”116 
However, holding that a misstatement that did not affect the stock 
price could not be actionable makes sense as a prerequisite to getting a 
presumption of reliance. A plaintiff suing on a misstatement that did not 
change the stock price for better or worse, cannot be said to have “but for” 
relied on that particular statement. With no “transactional causation” the 
buyer perhaps should not be entitled to a presumption of reliance. The 
buyer was going to buy at that particular fraudulent price, whether or not a 
later misstatement was made. This view by no means diminishes the fact 
that the misstatement that actually caused the inflation is actionable and 
plaintiffs are entitled to a presumption of reliance. The view instead 
suggests that later misstatements that had no effect on the market price 
cannot be “relied” upon in any circumstance. 
Although the above is quite logical, it creates a severe injustice on 
plaintiffs such as those in FindWhat. Plaintiffs which have had their class 
period shortened, often for various reasons,117 may have no choice but to 
use confirmatory statements to file securities fraud. By allowing the 
defendant corporations to just point to fact that their fraudulent statements 
didn’t move the market to essentially win the case, is unfair to plaintiffs and 
against public policy.  This is certainly the view the Eleventh Circuit had: 
We decline to erect a per se rule that, once a market is already misinformed 
about a particular truth, corporations are free to knowingly and intentionally 
reinforce material misconceptions by repeating falsehoods with impunity. 
                                                                                                                           
 
113 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). 
114 Id. at 248. 
115 Id. at 256 n.7 (White, J., dissenting). 
116 Rowley, supra note 112. 
117 Often due to pleading, such as 12(b)(6) problems, or because the original inflating statement 
was not actionable because of lack of duty, or was a leaked non-public statement. 
182 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 31:163 
 
Vol. 31 (2012-2013) Ɣ ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) Ɣ ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2013.54 Ɣ http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Defendants who commit fraud to prop up an already inflated stock price do not 
get an automatic free pass under the securities laws.118 
Whether a court uses public policy to determine an issue is a tough line 
to draw. However, the Supreme Court said in Basic that presumptions are 
effective to allocate the burdens of proof and are created “out of 
considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability, as well as judicial 
economy.”119 The presumption was also created out of “common sense and 
probability.”120 A result allowing material misstatements to be non-
actionable because they repeat fraudulent information the market has 
already absorbed, is not adhere to the Basic principles of “fairness” and 
“public policy.” 
If the Fifth Circuit view is adopted it could have a lasting effect on 
commerce. Corporations with an inflated stock price would have an 
incentive to keep their stock price “propped” up as to induce as many 
traders to buy the stock, and maintain “good times” until they get caught. 
Immunizing defendants who disseminate fraudulent material just because 
the market already believed the information does not take the perspective of 
the trader who bought the fraudulently high stock into consideration. For if 
the corporation was honest during instead of making confirmatory 
statements, the trader would not have bought the stock in the first place. 
This not only brings unsuspecting traders into unwanted law suits to just 
recover their money, but also stifles trade in general by leaving no incentive 
for a corporation to correct a fraudulent statement and telling the public it is 
“okay” to keep market prices fraudulently high. 
This is a classic case of logic creating an unfair result, the very 
situation in which public policy should be used to override it. The Eleventh 
Circuit does not want fraudulent statements to continually be repeated with 
no penalty, and perhaps harm to innocent plaintiffs. The Supreme Court 
should agree, seeing as how Basic adopted the fraud-on-the-market doctrine 
with public policy resonating in their minds. 
                                                                                                                           
 
118 FindWhat Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011). 
119 Basic, 485 U.S. at 245. 
120 Id. at 246. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Greenberg, that confirmatory 
misstatements are non-actionable in fraud-on-the-market Rule 10b-5 suits, 
may have a basis in logic, but completely disregards public policy. The 
Supreme Court should hear the issue to prevent forum shopping and unduly 
results from happening in the Fifth Circuit and other potential places where 
the Greenberg view may arise. The Court, on the basis of Basic, should 
adopt the Eleventh Circuit view, which relies on public policy, and put an 
end to the circuit split. 
